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SOUTH CAROLINA'S JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM: REFORM IN A 
TRADITIONALISTIC SETTING 
Steven W. Hays, University of South Carolina 
Since the 1970s, South Carolina's judicial system has 
experienced a remarkable transformation. Spurred on by a nation-wide 
effort to modernize court operations, the state government has 
implemented a variety of reforms that are intended to simplify the 
judicial structure, to enhance the courts' ability to process cases 
efficiently, and to ameliorate such age-old problems as antiquated 
procedures and overlapping jurisdictions. Although these reforms have 
not placed South Carolina in the forefront of the judicial modernization 
movement, they have certainly improved the operation of the courts and 
altered many of the traditional power relationships that once 
characterized the State's legal system. 
The purpose of this article is to provide a comparative 
assessment of South Carolina's courts. Specifically, the progress of 
judicial system reform in the State is evaluated in the context of 
developments that have swept across the United States during the past 
three decades. The inquiry is intended to determine if the State's 
judicial system has progressed beyond its highly traditionalistic roots, 
and to speculate as to probable direction of future reform attempts. 
Courts and Political Culture 
Judicial systems are, by almost any standard, the most 
traditional of all political institutions. Th.is fact is attributable to at least 
two characteristics of the judicial branch of government. First, the 
courts' focus on law and procedure breeds conservatism. Th.is 
phenomenon is evident in the judges' adherence to stare decisis 
(common law precedent), in the legal profession's fixation on Latin 
terminology and archaic courtroom theatrics, and in the judiciary's 
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fervent belief (one that is not always followed in practice) that due 
process considerations take precedence over the needs for political 
responsiveness, budgetary exigencies, or other competing demands. 
Providing litigants with fair and impartial hearings is the putative goal, 
one that relies heavily on time-honored traditions. Within this milieu, 
the status quo is a seductive mistress. 
This affection for tradition is reinforced by the dynamics that 
surround the judicial system's place in the governmental system. From 
its earliest origins in England , our justice system has exhibited a 
conservative bent. Having been created and staffed by elites within 
political and economic communities, American courts long served the 
interests of legislative bodies and the propertied classes. Although this 
situation has changed (at least in some areas) over the past 50 years, 
the fact that courts are political institutions with strong ties to "the 
establishment" cannot be overstated. Even those who argue that 
"justice is blind" generally admit that status and influence creep through 
Lady Justice's blindfold. 
Despite their obviously political nature, judicial systems 
typically maintain a polite fiction concerning their appropriate role in 
the governmental structure. According to accepted convention, the 
courts were never intended to accommodate changing public fashions, 
but were supposed to be insulated from the ebb and flow of political 
strife. As arbiters of controversial public and private disputes, and 
with the ability to use their powers of judicial review to negate or alter 
the actions of executive and legislative officials, every societal group 
has an interest (at least theoretically) in maintaining the courts' 
impartiality. For this reason, ~olitical systems at all levels of 
government within the United States have long paid lip service to the 
virtues of judicial independence. 
For the first 150 years of our nation's history, state court 
systems rarely (if ever) approached the idealized version of 
independence that is popularized in high school civics books. The 
courts were snared in a sticky political web; most were completely 
reliant upon the other branches of government for financial support, 
personnel, and even the procedures that they followed. At the urging 
of such groups as the American Bar Association and the American 
Judicature Society, however, state legislatures in this century began to 
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take steps toward the creation of truly independent judiciaries. In 
addition to being provided with greater control over their own 
operations, the entire system of justice delivery in many states was 
simplified and modernized. Because this process of court reform is 
relatively recent, and since most states started from about the same 
place in their journeys toward judicial modernization (i.e., the typical 
court system started out as a vassal of the legislature), a status report 
on the progress that has been made can provide some revealing insights 
into the state's underlying political culture. 
What traits should we expect to find in states with differing 
political cultures? If we adapt Daniel Elazar's celebrated typology 
(moralistic/ individualistic/ traditionalistic) to the courts, 1 it would 
probably be safe to conclude that judicial independence and neutrality 
are most highly valued in a moralistic political culture. In the pursuit 
of "the public good," the integrity and independence of the state's 
judicial system must be beyond reproach. Thus, we would expect the 
court system to be relatively autonomous of legislative or executive 
involvement. Judges would be selected in a relatively neutral and 
equitable fashion, the judiciary's operating budget would be secure 
from political manipulations, and judicial procedures would be the 
exclusive province of the judges, not the legislature. In other words, 
judges would rule their own house with a minimum of legislative or 
executive intrusion. 
Courts within an individualistic culture, in slight contrast, 
would most likely emphasize such traits as efficiency and 
responsiveness to public demands. Measures aimed at making the 
courts accessible to the public would be of primary concern. In an 
individualistic setting, then, we would anticipate the widespread use of 
small claims courts, night courts, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
techniques, and other innovations that encourage the speedy settlement 
of legal controversies. Instead of promoting the interests of society's 
"haves" -a common phenomenon among judicial systems in every 
political setting2-the judiciary would strive to level the playing field. 
Groups such as landlords, creditors and employers would begin to lose 
their long-standing advantages in the judicial system in response to 
demands from tenants, debtors and employees. Likewise, a premium 
would be placed on modernizing and streamlining judicial procedures 
Volume 24, 1996 \ 205 
Steven W. Hays 
due to the fact that such measures would further enhance the courts' 
ability to serve the public's private needs. 
Judiciaries in traditionalistic political cultures, conversely, can 
be expected to be neither responsive nor independent. As instruments 
of the political elite, the courts would likely be kept in a subservient 
role vis-a-vis the legislative and/or executive branches of government. 
Politically charged judicial selection would be a probable fixture, as 
would external controls over the judiciary's procedures, personnel, and 
budgets. There would be few evident attempts to enlarge the public's 
access to the courts, and even fewer measures designed to reverse the 
traditional advantage of society's "haves" over the "have-nots". The 
courts would be a conservative organ of the existing power structure. 
Serving the elites would thus take precedence over such competing 
values as efficiency, professionalism, responsiveness to the public, or 
impartiality. 
Court Reform Comes to South Carolina 
In order to place South Carolina's judicial system in its 
appropriate political context, it is first necessary to review the situation 
before and after the reform movement. As was the case virtually 
everywhere, the State's court system evolved over many years in a 
haphazard and even chaotic fashion. The General Assembly, which 
had seized control of the judicial branch immediately after the 
Revolution, distrusted the idea of an independent judiciary due in part 
to lingering memories of the abuses that had occurred under the King's 
courts. Later, the legislature's suspicion of the legal system was 
heightened by the attempts of some state judiciaries (but not South 
Carolina's) to negate legislative actions through judicial review. 3 Fears 
of similar behavior in this State, coupled with the low profesmonal 
status of the legal profession, eliminated any reluctance that the General 
Assembly might have had toward meddling in judicial affairs. 
Instead of vesting significant powers in legislative committees 
or a central appellate court, the General Assembly followed a 
"strategy" of decentralization Wider which specialized courts were 
created for cities and counties whenever the apparent need arose. 
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Because the legislature directly selected much of the judiciary, and 
because the costs of new courts were largely borne by the jurisdictions 
in which they were located, courts sprung up like mushrooms across 
the South Carolina landscape. The General Assembly quickly 
developed a penchant for electing its own members, or close friends of 
influential legislators, to most of the new judgeships. Meanwhile, the 
process of court creation intensified throughout most of the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries. The movement was spurred by urbanization . 
and industrializ.ation, both of which led to increased levels of litigation 
and related demands for new types of courts to deal with emerging 
classes of disputes (such as juvenile, landlord-tenant, and divorce 
cases). 
A predictable consequence of this evolutionary process was 
that the resulting judicial "system" was little more than "a hodgepodge 
of courts, lacking in uniformity and consistency. "4 Many of the courts 
operated semi-autonomously, thereby developing highly inconsistent 
procedures and jurisdictional responsibilities. In addition to creating 
confusion among citizens and attorneys, this situation resulted in 
significant differences in the quality of judicial services between and 
among counties. The chaotic state of affairs prompted legal scholars 
to apply such terms as "administrative swamp" and "judicial anarchy" 
to the local justice system. 5 
The extent of South Carolina's problem was brought into sharp 
focus in 1971, when the Institute of Judicial Administration (a national 
reform group) concluded that the existing labyrinth of courts with 
overlapping and inconsistent jurisdictions "defies classification". 6 A 
diagram of the state court system indicated that six types of trial courts 
existed (magistrate , municipal, probate, domestic relations and 
children's, county, and circuit) , yet no single judicial district contained 
all of the types represented. Moreover , the pattern of lines of appeals 
varied. Cases appealed from municipal court could, in some counties, 
be taken to the county courts, while in other counties these cases were 
reviewed by circuit courts. Adding to the confusion was the fact that 
some county courts could hear only civil cases, with the jurisdictional 
amounts varying by court, while others heard both civil and criminal 
litigation. 1 
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By the early 1970s, enormous pressures for court reform were 
building within the legal profession and the public at large. These 
forces were stimulated by a variety of factors, including dissatisfaction 
with the different courts' vague and conflicting jurisdictions, a growing 
problem with court delay, unevenness of judicial workloads, and 
archaic facilities and recordkeeping practices. 8 After two centuries of 
thoughtless inattention, the State' s court system seemed to be serving 
no one ' s interests , save for a small group of judges and well-connected 
associates. 
Thanks largely to the efforts of a small group of progressive 
legislators, who were motivated by a bar-sponsored citizens' 
movement, court reform finally arrived in South Carolina in 1972. In 
that year a revised version of the Judicial Article of the State 
Constitution was approved by the voters. This article was intended to 
establish a "unified court system" with consistent legal procedures and 
uniform avenues of appeal. Although the Article formally took effect 
in 1973, it did not immediately transform the state ' s courts. Instead , 
the Article merely stated broad intentions regarding the structure and 
administration of the unified court system, leaving the specifics to be 
worked out over time. Thus , the revision of the Judicial Article set a 
gradual and continuing process of court reform into motion . 
Conventional Wisdom of Court Reform: 
Attack on Traditionalism 
Before exploring the specific changes that have occurred in 
South Carolina's courts in the recent past, the reform tradition that 
spawned these developments needs to be briefly examined. The 
conventional wisdom of court reform first began to take shape in a 
1906 address to the American Bar Association by Roscoe Pound , Dean 
of the Harvard Law School. Pound chided his colleagues for their 
complacency in the face of judicial ineptitude , and criticized three 
specific aspects of court administration: court multiplicity (the existence 
of too many specialized courts), concurrent jurisdictions (overlapping 
jurisdictions that permit litigants to select the courts to which they will 
take their cases), and the resulting waste of judicial manpower. 
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In effect, these criticisms were an attack on the traditionalistic 
practices that were prevalent in almost all states. Pound's proposed 
solutions , meanwhile, are grounded largely in the themes that permeate 
both moralistic and individualistic cultures. He argued that judicial 
branches ought to be granted their independence from legislative 
bodies. To accomplish this ambitious objective, he advocated the 
creation of "unified court systems" under which the state's supreme 
court would have administrative, budgetary, and procedural control 
over all lower courts. In addition to granting the courts their 
independence, the unified court concept implicitly advanced the goal of 
making judicial systems more businesslike and efficient. By eliminating 
legislative intrusions, and by providing the judiciary with a clear 
administrative master, Pound hoped that the courts would begin to 
function in a more responsible and effective manner. 
Although Pound's indictment of the courts was not originally 
well received by the legal profession, by 1938 the ABA had adopted 
many of his proposals in its resolutions for judicial reform. These 
resolutions , known as the Parker-Vanderbilt Standards,9 called for a 
unified judicial organization in which the state's highest court would be 
granted full administrative and rule-making authority over the entire 
court system. These reform suggestions were expanded by the 1962 
ABA Model State Judicial Article. In addition to advocating simplified 
judicial structures and lear lines of administrative authority , the Model 
Article included pleas for merit selection of judges, the appointment of 
professional court administrators, and judicial discipline and removal 
mechanisms. 10 
The latest and most sophisticated reform recommendations, the 
1990 ABA Standards Relating to Court Organization, 11 continue to 
emphasize the themes of judicial independence and administrative 
efficiency . The ABA's clear goal is to empower state court systems by 
giving them centralized control over all facets of their operation, and 
to ensure them a steady and reliable source of revenue that is not 
dependent upon the other branches. Included within the ABA's most 
strident suggestions are the elimination of all specialized courts, the 
vesting of unrestricted administrative authority in the state 's highest 
court (or its chief justice) , state financing of the judicial system (to 
eliminate the courts ' reliance on unpredictable funding sources,) and 
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merit selection of judges (to reduce the lik.elihood that incompetent 
judges obtain their positions through politicized, corrupt, or otherwise 
unseemly processes). Obviously, this list of reforms echoes many 
"good government" theliles, along with an undertone of "administntive 
management" practices. Both moralistic and imividualistic elements 
are clearly evident. 
The Tense Path Toward Reform 
Compared to the anarchy that prevailed prior to the adoption 
of the new Judicial Article (Article 5), the current court system in 
South Carolina is a model of simplicity and order. Although the 
improvements did not always occur smoothly, the General Assembly 
deserves credit for permitting the reform process to continue, however 
gradually or reluctantly. 
The most significant component of Article 5 originally 
stipulated that "the judicial power of the state be vested in a unified 
judicial system which shall include a Supreme Court, a Circuit Court, 
and such other courts of limited jurisdiction as may be provided by 
general law. " The Article went on to note that "any existing court may 
be continued as authorized by law until this article is implemented 
pursuant to such schedule as may hereafter be adopted. " 
In effect, these provisions established a two-tier court system 
(Supreme Court and Circuit Courts} but did not preclude the possibility 
that existing specialized courts could continue indefinitely. Moreover, 
the Article was sufficiently vague to leave the question open as to 
whether or not the General Assembly was empowered to create new 
courts that were not formally included in the unified system. 
This situation resulted in a series of confrontations between the 
General Assembly and the Supreme Court. In 1975, for example, the 
Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of29 statutes dealing with 
the court system that had been passed after the adoption of Article 5. 
These statutes created new local courts, added judgeships to courts that 
already existed, and altered and/or established courts in the probate 
court system. In every instance, the Supreme Court ruled that changes 
in the judicial system that did not conform to the unification 
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requirement of Article 5 were unconstitutional . This series of 
skirmishes was temporarily resolved in 1976, when the General 
Assembly finally moved to implement a unified court structure. Specific 
steps included the creation of a coherent family court structure in 1977, 
the phase-out of county courts "and other similar courts inferior to the 
circuit court " by 1979, and arrogation of authority over these lower 
courts to the unified court system. 12 
Despite these important advances, however, relations between 
the General Assembly and the judiciary were anything but cordial. For 
example, conflict erupted between 1979 and 1984 when the Supreme 
Court's plea for the creation of an Intermediate Court of Appeals was 
used by the General Assembly as a means to reassert its control over 
the administrative and rulemaking authority of the unified court system. 
In a tug-of-war spanning five years, the General Assembly attempted 
on different occasions to dilute the Supreme Court's rulemaking 
authority by granting the new appeals court (instead of the Supreme 
Court) control over its own internal procedures, and by making all 
rulemaking actions of the court system "subject to and not inconsistent 
with statutory law. "13 The General Assembly's irritation with the 
judicial branch had been inflamed in 1979 when the Supreme Court 
declared that the legislature could not appoint four of its incumbent 
members to seats on the new appeals court (which had been created on 
a temporary basis by statute). That action was ruled invalid because it 
conflicted with a statute that prohibited any legislator from being 
elected to an office created during his/her term in the General 
Assembly. 
After five years of highly embarrassing squabbles, a truce was 
finally declared in 1984. The Court of Appeals was permanently 
established through a constitutional referendum, and the General 
Assembly abandoned its attempts to take back the Supreme Court's 
hard-won authority over management and rulemaking for the unified 
judicial system. Relative peace has prevailed since 1984, save for 
intermittent controversies surrounding judicial elections. 
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The Reformed Judicial Structure 
The gradual revisions in court structure have resulted in a table 
of judicial organization that is not extremely different from the one 
advocated by the ABA standards. Compared to the confusing array of 
courts that existed prior to reform, the system presently consists of a 
two-tier trial court arrangement and two levels of appellate courts. 
Additionally, the system contains a number of specialized courts at the 
local and county levels (Figure 1). 
The most numerous courts in the State are "limited 
jurisdiction," meaning that they are restricted to hearing minor criminal 
and civil cases. The State's 295 (approximately) magistrate courts have 
jurisdiction over criminal offenses "subject to the penalty or fine not 
exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding 30 days. "14 Their civil 
jurisdiction extends to cases involving up to $5,000. The 201 
municipal courts, which can be created by action of any local governing 
body, have no civiljurisidiction. Their criminal jurisdiction is identical 
to that of the magistrate courts; they are intended to adjudicate minor 
legal violations that occur within the city boundaries. Many municipal 
courts are staffed by magistrates in contractual arrangements handled 
through the county governments (for whom the magistrates technically 
work); the remaining municipal court judges are chosen by their 
jurisdictions' governing bodies. 
Magistrates, whose offices originated during the colonial era, 
perform two critical functions in addition to deciding cases. They 
conduct pre-trial and preliminary hearings for all offenders charged 
with crimes, and they issue search and arrest warrants when probable 
cause exists. Given this range of responsibility, it is notable that 
magistrates are not required to be attorneys. In fact, the only statutory 
requirement is that they be qualified electors in the counties in which 
they intend to serve. And, significantly, the absence of a law degree 
does not appear to figure prominently in the selection process; only a 
small percentage of the sitting magistrates possess formal legal training. 
They are appointed by the Governor upon the advice and consent of the 
Senate; under the system of "senatorial courtesy," this means that 
Senators effectively control magisterial appointments within their 
counties. 
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The next highest tier of courts includes two "special 
jurisdiction" bodies, family courts and probate courts . Prior to court 
reform, several counties contained no special courts for family matters 
while others employed either domestic relations courts or juvenile 
courts. This situation was resolved in 1976 when the Family Court 
System was created . These courts are the sole forum for cases 
pertaining to marriage, divorce , separation , custody , visitation, 
termination of parental rights, alimony, and name changes. They also 
have exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles who are charged with crimes. 
Family court judges are elected by the General Assembly for four-year 
terms. Under the unified court system, the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court appoints one family court judge to serve as Chief 
Judge. This individual is the administrative head of the Family Court 
system, and has the power to supervise the business of the court and to 
reassign the 49 family court judges for maximum efficiency. 
The second major court of special jurisdiction, the probate 
courts , supervise the disposition of estates and resolve disputes arising 
from contested wills . Other functions include issuance and recording 
of marriage licenses and supervision of guardians for minors . Each 
county in the State contains a probate court. Probate judges are 
popularly elected within their counties to four-year terms. The only 
statutory requirement for the office is that the candidate be a qualified 
elector of the county . 
The next tier in the judicial hierarchy, the circuit courts, 
represent the "workhorses" of the South Carolina judicial system. As 
trial courts of general jurisdiction, they decide all cases except those for 
which exclusive jurisdiction is reserved to courts of limited or special 
jurisdiction . Thus, the circuit courts hear civil cases exceeding $5,000 
in value, and criminal cases in which the possible penalties are greater 
than $500 or 30 days in jail. They also have authority to hear cases de 
novo or on appellate review from the inferior courts (every litigant who 
is tried before a non-attorney judge or magistrate is entitled to such 
review). Each circuit is divided into a court of common pleas for civil 
matters and a court of general sessions for criminal cases. The state 
is currently divided into 16 judicial districts which range in size from 
two to four counties. The General Assembly, which elects circuit court 
judges, has set the number of judgeships at 43. Each district in the 
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state is assigned a resident judge, and the remaining judges are subject 
to rotation within their own circuits or to other circuits if a caseload 
imbalance is present. 
The state ' s appellate courts consist of the Supreme Court and 
the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court, which is composed of a 
Chief Justice and four associate justices, is primarily occupied with 
reviewing cases that are appealed to it on errors of law. Beyond its 
decision-making capacity, the court has extensive responsibility and 
power as the procedural rule-making and administrative authority for 
the unified judicial system. Justices of the Supreme Court are selected 
by vote of the General Assembly to serve ten-year terms. 
With the creation of the Court of Appeals in 1983, the 
Supreme Court reserved jurisdiction over cases on certiorari 
(discretionary appeal) from the new appellate courts, as well as five 
classes of appeal directly from lower trial courts. These include cases 
involving the death penalty, public utility rates, major constitutional 
issues, public bond issues, and the election laws. 15 All other classes of 
appellate litigation are now heard by the Court of Appeals, which was 
created expressly to reduce the Supreme Court's decisional burden. 
This intermediate appellate court consists of a Chief Judge and seven 
associate judges who are elected by the General Assembly to staggered 
terms of six years. 
Assessing the Reforms: How Does South Carolina Compare? 
As has been noted, South Carolina's current judicial system 
represents a profound improvement over the depressing situation that 
existed prior to the revision of Article 5. Many of the worst vestiges 
of the old traditionalistic system have been abolished and replaced with 
structures and practices that adhere fairly closely to the ABA's 
prescribed model. Each step toward a unified court system takes the 
system farther away from its tradition-bound past. 
Despite making impressive strides, however, the state's courts 
do not always compare favorably with the level of progress that has 
been made elsewhere. Some of the remaining problems are relatively 
minor, yet others constitute serious challenges to the reform 
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agenda and to the courts' efforts to modernize and to reinforce their 
fledgling independence. 
Structural Comparisons: A Status Report 
The creation of the unified court system is clearly South 
Carolina's most significant reform achievement. Although impressive 
structural alterations have been implemented, the system remains a 
considerable distance from the model espoused by the ABA. The 
primary area of inconsistency concerns the ABA recommendation 
governing trial courts of original jurisdiction. The ABA prescribes a 
single court with general jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters. 
This idea dates all the way back to Roscoe Pound, who argued for 
"specialized judges, not specialized courts!" 16 Where this format bas 
been employed in other states, the court is usually divided into judicial 
departments that specialize in various classes of disputes (e.g., civil, 
criminal, traffic, probate, juvenile, domestic). By placing all of these 
judicial functions in one court, tinder a single chief (administrative) 
judge, most commentators agree that judicial efficiency will improve 
and the consistency and quality of justice will be enhanced. 
In order to conform to the "ideal" structure, South Carolina 
would need to abolish several courts-magistrate, municipal, family, 
and probate-and assign their functions to the circuit courts. Because 
of the existence of these special and limited jurisdiction courts, the state 
ranks in the bottom 40 percent of all states on a "court consolidation 
and unification" scale. 17 Although less than ten states currently have 
just one trial court of general jurisdiction, over 30 states contain 
judicial structures with fewer separate courts than are now present in 
South Carolina. The most common arrangement is a two-tier court 
structure consisting of a county court (limited jurisdiction) and a circuit 
(often called "superior") court of general jurisdiction. 
Perhaps the most disturbing trait of the current arrangement is 
the continued presence of restricted jurisdiction courts staffed by non-
attorney judges. Astoundingly, magistrate and municipal courts 
adjudicate over 1.5 million cases per year, 18 a number that far exceeds 
the total output of all the other courts combined. Even though 
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these cases are relatively "minor" (predominantly traffic offenses, 
ordinance violations, and minor civil claims), the involvement of non-
attorney judges raises serious questions about the quality and fairness 
of the proceedings. 
Administrative Arrangements: Not Quite Independent 
Prior to reform, South Carolina's courts were a leaderless 
array of loosely connected entities. Except for the General Assembly, 
which frequently imposed rules and regulations, there was no 
administrative accountability. Without any coherent direction, 
personnel were not efficiently utilized, financial resources were 
maldistributed, and the courts' operating practices varied widely across 
the state. 
The revision of Article 5 addressed these traditonal dilemmas 
by vesting administrative and rule-making authority within the Supreme 
Court. Under Section 4 of the Article, the Chief Justice is designated 
as the administrative head of the unified judicial system. To carry out 
his administrative mission, the Chief Justice has constitutional power 
to appoint an administrator for the courts and such assistants as he 
deems necessary. Consistent with ABA recommendations, the Office 
of South Carolina Court Administration was established in 1973 to 
serve as the Chief Justice's administrative support staff. The diverse 
functions of this office include: case tracking, calendar management, 
provision of legal education for judges and other personnel, and 
statistical compilations to aid the Chief Justice in making decisions 
concerning resource allocations, the assignment of judges, and revisions 
in judicial rules and procedures. 
Collectively, these reforms provide the unified court system 
with an unprecedented amount of control over its own affairs. If we 
focus only on the concrete indicators- the existence of constitutional, 
administrative, and rulemaking authority within the court system, 
coupled with a cadre of professional court administrators-South 
Carolina's courts are in remarkable conformity with the reform 
literature, as delineated by the ABA standards. The changes have 
enabled the Supreme Court to continually refine rules and procedures, 
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to allocate reources more efficiently, and to implement a coherent and 
effective system of operating practices. 
While, once again, South Carolina's judicial reformers have 
reason to be proud of their accomplishments, clouds continue to lurk 
on the horizon. True judicial independence-at least as it is articulated 
by the ABA and other reform groups - cannot be achieved until 
additional changes are made. One of the most troublesome facets of 
the current arrangement is the continued ability of the General 
Assembly to negate judicial rules if it so desires. Although legislators 
have not used their powers to meddle with great frequency , the fight 
over the Court of Appeals discussed earlier serves as an implicit 
warning to the Supreme Court that the General Assembly might at any 
time insert itself into the internal affairs of the unified court system. 
Another impediment to independence arises from the court 
systems' lack of control over many quasi-judicial personnel. Purists 
within the court reform community contend that true self-determination 
cannot be achieved until the judiciary exercises managerial supremacy 
over all the employees who work within it. No other organ of 
government is as dependent upon personnel who are provided by 
external groups as are the courts . For example, courts rely upon the 
services of court reporters and stenographers (who are often provided 
by county government through contractual arrangements) , bailiffs (who 
are supplied by elected sheriffs) , and deputy clerks (who are employed 
by county government through the court clerks' offices) . Each of these 
workers plays a significant role in the operation and maintenance of the 
judicial system, yet none works directly for judges. This situation is 
especially troublesome in regard to court clerks, who in South Carolina 
are popularly elected within each county . These individuals are 
important judicial actors in that they are responsible for courthouse 
operations , recordkeeping, disposition of fines, and entry and 
preservation of calendars and dockets . If an incompetent or even 
illiterate court clerk happens to be elected- a scenario that has actually 
occurred on occasion-the impact on the justice system can be quite 
serious. 19 For this reason , court reformers strongly endorse the idea 
that court clerks be appointed, not elected, and that other auxiliary 
personnel be minimally subject to judicially-enforced performance 
requirements. 
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The final shortcoming in the courts' attempt to achieve 
independence stems from their continued dependence upon the other 
branches of government for financial support. All reform groups agree 
that judicial systems should be empowered to prepare and allocate their 
own budgets, and that the state should completely fund judicial 
expenditures. The fiscal status of South Carolina's courts, however, 
continues to be highly decentralized. Many judicial personnel are paid 
from county or city funds, and most of the state's judicial facilities are 
maintained by local gov~rnment.-. Moreover, even that portion of the 
court budget which is state-funded is the exclusive province of the other 
branches. The State Budget and Control Board is responsible for 
preparing the budget for consideration by the General Assembly. This 
situation bas been an intermittent source of friction between the judicial 
and legislative branches. A recurrent complaint is that the courts are 
being "starved" by the legislature, an allegation that is substantiated by 
unprecedented case backlogs at every level of the system. In response 
to the court delay dilemma, and bolstered by a former Chief Justice's 
comment that the courts are "overextended, understaffed, and 
overwhelmed," the General Assembly added nine new judgeships early 
in 1996.20 
Relative to other states, South Carolina's method of financing 
the courts is not very atypical. Of the reform proposals contained 
within the ABA standards, state governments have been most reluctant 
to institute full state financing of the judicial system. Likewise, there 
bas not been a headlong rush to grant supreme courts unilateral control 
over all budgetary matters. So, on this dimension at least, the state's 
level of modernization does not lag significantly behind that which 
exists elsewhere in the United States. 
Judicial Selection: Tradition Reigns 
Next to court unification, the most enduring theme of the 
national court reform movement is merit selection of judges. This bas 
been a central component of every reform proposal that bas been issued 
in the past 50 years. 2 1 Although the specifics vary , the basic purpose 
of merit selection is to establish a neutral screening system that 
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emphasizes judicial candidates' qualifications and competence over 
political considerations. Ordinarily, this is accomplished by turning the 
screening process over to a nonpartisan nominating commission 
composed of both laymen and legal professionals. Upon nomination , 
candidates are appointed by the governor , after which they typically 
must stand for a retention election within a specified period of time 
(usually one year) .22 
Prior to the advent of the court reform movement, the judicial 
selection stategies that were used in most states were little more than 
accidents of history. That is , they reflected the ideas regarding judicial 
selection that were dominant at the time the states' constitutions were 
adopted. 23 Thus, states of the original 13 colonies favored legislative 
election or gubernatorial appointment , while states that entered the 
Union during the Jacksonian period opted for popular election . These 
forms of selection did not begin to be displaced until the 1940s, when 
the first merit plans were proposed. Since that time, 35 states have 
implemented merit screening programs for some or all of their judges. 24 
Of the nine states that once used legislative elections to select judges , 
only Virginia and South Carolina retain that format. . 
To assert that legislative election of judges has experienced a 
"checkered past" is a gross understatement. As it has traditionally been 
conducted, and as it carries on today , the process is perhaps the most 
flawed and corrupt approach to judicial screening that has ever been 
devised. Each judicial election reinforces disturbing lessons about the 
system's failings. Moreover, the legislature's "track record" in this 
regard provides telling evidence that traditionalistic tendencies continue 
to exert tremendous influence on the policymaking process. 
The flaws of legislative selection, and the horror stories 
surrounding particular contests for seats on the bench , are almost too 
numerous to -detail here. First, consider the fact that 70 percent of the 
circuit court judges, all of the Supreme Court justices, and three Court 
of Appeals appointees are_ former members of the General Assembly . 
Given these figures, one can only conclude that legislative service is 
almost a prerequisite for judicial appointment . When non-legislators 
compete for positions on the bench, they almost always lose to 
legislators. This situation clearly discourages many qualified applicants 
from seeking judicial appointments , thereby narrowing the field to a 
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tiny group of well-connected politicians and their cronies. 
Having already restricted the applicant pool, legislative 
selection's next offense is to virtually ignore the qualifications of the 
candidates for judicial office. Between 1992 and 1996, for instance, 
the General Assembly re-elected two circuit judges who had been 
reprimanded for ethical misconduct, elected a House member who was 
deemed "unqualified" by the General Assembly's own judicial 
screening committee, re-elected a circuit judge who most members 
conceded "didn't understand the law," and elected an appellate court 
judge who was evaluated as the least qualified of the three candidates 
for that particular seat. Early in 1996, moreover, the General 
Assembly elected a House member to a seat on the Court of Appeals 
over another candidate who is widely regarded as the best circuit court 
judge in the state. To make matters worse, the winning candidate 
"flunked the bar exam twice, and was rated unqualified for the bench 
by the state Bar. "25 Incidents such as these led one reform-oriented 
legislator to remark, "The politics in judicial races defies gravity . . . 
cream doesn't rise to the top, it goes to the bottom. "26 
In addition to staffing the judiciary with judges who are 
undoubtedly less qualified than they could be, legislative selection 
results in many ugly displays that degrade the process. Because seats 
on the bench are such valued plums, each selection is marked by strong 
lobbying efforts, vote counting, "horse trading," and arm twisting. 
Candidates for judgeships circulate through the State House, slapping 
backs and collecting commitments for votes (even though it is 
technically illegal for a candidate to ask for votes prior to being cleared 
by the judicial screening committee). 
The contests have become so politicized that, just recently, a 
new and even more disturbing trend is developing. Candidates for re-
election to the bench are increasingly facing opposition, a practice that 
rarely occurred until the 1990s. Campaigns against minority judges 
(especially women) appear to be particularly intense. The failure of a 
family court judge to win re-election in 1995 marked the first time in 
the current century that a sitting judge was removed by the General 
Assembly. Soon thereafter, however, the General Assembly subjected 
the only female Supreme Court justice to an embarrassing round of 
public hearings. Despite being the acknowledged "intellectual giant" on 
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the Court, she was forced to defend herself against charges that she 
was too blunt and insensitive with her support staff. Lurking behind 
the charade were allegations from some politicians that she was too 
liberal, too "pro-tax," and that she had offended the Governor's father 
by deciding against him in a civil case. Although she won re-election, 
the process set off at least two alarm bells: that all judicial re-elections 
will now be contested events, and that a judge 's political ideology and 
decision history will become important considerations in future 
elections. 27 
The stink emanating from the General Assembly's recent 
record of judicial elections is spurring renewed efforts to reform the 
process. Although no one has seriously proposed a merit selection 
protocol that removes the ultimate decision power from the legislature, 
a House-passed measure would at least begin the reform process. The 
bill would tighten qualifications for judges, prohibit sitting legislators 
from running for the bench, establish an impartial commission of 
laypersons and attorneys to nominate candidates, and deny any 
candidate the right to run without the commission's approval . Because 
a two-thirds majority of the Senate is needed to pass the measure (a 
constitutional amendment), its prospects are dim. 28 
Is the Verdict In? 
Based on the accomplishments to date, can a definitive 
judgment be rendered concerning the status of South Carolina's judicial 
system? Have they been reformed sufficiently to be termed 
"modernized," or do traditionalistic values still dominate? 
Weighing heavily on the positive side of the ledger is the 
impressive assortment of court reforms that have been engineered 
during the past three decades. Court consolidation and simplification 
have progressed nicely, bringing order and continuity to a system that 
was once irrational. The creation of a unified court system gives 
judges many of the necessary tools to accomplish their tasks efficiently. 
Centralized rule-making and administrative authority provide the court 
system with the highest level of autonomy that has ever been present 
in the state's courts. Thus, both moralistic and individualistic 
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objectives have clearly been achieved. The courts are far more 
independent than they once were, and their performance and 
accessibility to the public have unquestionably been improved. In a 
very real sense, the progress has been astounding. If evaluated purely 
on the basis of the reforms that have occurred within the borders of the 
state, even the most cynical observer would have to conclude that 
traditionalism has yielded some of its influence. 
If, on the other hand, one wishes to assess the South Carolina 
experience in the context of other political settings, there is less cause 
for optimism. Troublesome pockets of traditionalism remain in many 
prominent facets of the judicial system. By far the most egregious is 
legislative selection of judges, but other threats to the courts' 
independence also persist in the rule-making process (where the 
General Assembly retains veto power over the Supreme Court's 
actions), financial affairs (where the unified court system's dependence 
upon the other branches is nearly absolute), and in the management of 
auxiliary personnel (who are often beyond the courts' direct 
supervision). 
In addition to these apparent shortcomings, South Carolina's 
courts risk falling even further behind their counterparts in other states 
in a number of emerging areas. Perhaps the most notable 
contemporary trend in court management is the explosion of efforts to 
make state courts more accessible and responsive to the public. 29 Large 
numbers of states have recently encouraged the use of "private 
judging" (privately-retained mediators), ADR strategies (which are 
publically funded) and night courts. These measures not only ease the 
public's access to judicial services but also reduce backlog and delay, 
a benefit that is sorely needed in South Carolina. Except for the 
growing use of ADRs ( especially in child custody, employee grievance, 
and automobile accident cases), the state's use of such techniques is 
fairly limited. 
Other trends that seem to be commonplace elsewhere are 
concerted programs to promote equity in the courts and to evaluate 
judicial peformance. Task forces have been created in 39 states to 
examine gender and racial bias in the justice system. 30 By e~amining 
such processes as judicial selection, bail practices, sentencing, and the 
handling of domestic violence cases, the states hope to mioimiu 
Volume 24, 1996 \ 223 
Steven W. Hays 
discriminatory procedures and behaviors. Judicial performance 
evaluation efforts, similarly, have the dual purpose of expanding citizen 
participation in the judicial system while also improving the quality of 
the judiciary. Typically, such programs encourage the public to get 
involved in the review and evaluation of judicial performance, and in 
filing complaints where misconduct is evident. South Carolina, in 
contrast, has not yet launched any systematic anti-discrimination 
program, and operates "one of the most secretive disciplinary processes 
for judges and attorneys in the nation. "31 The openness of any 
governmental system to public scrutiny and participation is an excellent 
measure of progressivism and modernity; on this basis, South 
Carolina's court system does not measure up. 
One final aspect of judicial behavior deserves a brief mention. 
Since the 1960s, courts in many locations have provided society's less 
influential citizens with a voice that they are unable to obtain in the 
other branches of government. Courts in conservative political cultures 
tend to defend the status quo "through veto and delay, "32 while those 
in more progressive settings have been active in furthering the rights 
of the downtrodden. They innovate, develop new policy, and expand 
the rights of litigants. This latter trend is especially prevalent in regard 
to four classes of litigation: property law, contract law, tort law, and 
civil liberties. 33 Insofar as South Carolina is concerned, a predictable 
pattern is evident. Except for one case that opened government 
jurisdictions to tort liability, 34 and another that was unusually gracious 
to employees, 35 the state's judiciary has interpreted the law in a highly 
narrow and conservative fashion. More often than not, the interests of 
the established order prevail over those of the less well-connected. 
In summary, then, a mixed verdict seems inescapable. South 
Carolina has made substantial progress, but its courts do not yet reflect 
the characteristics that would be expected in either a moralistic or 
individualistic setting. Due to pressing economic demands, the most 
likely direction of continuing change will be toward business-like 
practices. Little resistance to the continued refinement of judicial 
procedures, and the addition of labor-saving innovations, is likely to 
occur. Opposition to modernization seems most probable where basic 
"who gets what" questions are addressed. Therefore, we can expect 
the General Assembly to resist merit selection and to strive mightily to 
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maintain other controls over the judicial system. To the extent that the 
legislators are successful, the state's courts will retain much of their 
traditionalistic character. 
Steven W. Hays is a professor of Political Science in the Department of 
Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina. 
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